We prove that elimination of a single Skolem function in pure logic increases the length of cut-free proofs only linearly. The result is shown for a variant of sequent calculus with Henkin constants instead of free variables. *
Introduction
In this paper we consider the following two questions, which are closely related to P. Pudlák's Problem 22 listed in [5] :
Given a cut-free proof of a formula from the axiom ∀xA[x, f (x)], where f is a new function symbol, find a cut-free proof of the formula from the axiom ∀x∃yA [x, y] . What is the complexity of the elimination of f ? Given a cut-free proof of a formula ∃xA[x, g(x)], where g is a new function symbol, find a cut-free proof of the formula ∃x∀yA [x, y] . What is the complexity of the elimination of g?
The Skolem functions f and g are called a witnessing function for ∀x∃yA and a counterexample function to ∃x∀yA, respectively.
Skolem functions play an important role both in proof theory and in automatic theorem proving. Skolemization with witnessing functions is a process which transforms a first-order formula to an equisatisfiable universal formula by replacing all its existential quantifiers with Skolem witnessing functions. We are interested here in the reverse process: given a proof of a formula from the skolemization of an axiom, what is the length of the shortest proof of the same formula from the (original) axiom? Skolemization with counterexample functions is used for transforming formulas to validity-equivalent existential formulas; the process, sometimes called the Herbrandization, is dual to the previous one.
The complexity of general methods for eliminating Skolem functions from proofs is at least exponential (see [7, 8, 10, 3] ), some of them are even superexponential. A partial positive solution is given by Avigad in [2] : theories strong enough to code finite functions can eliminate Skolem functions in polynomial time. But the general problem for predicate calculus either with or without equality is still an open question.
In this paper we consider the problem of deskolemization for first-order logic without equality. We show that elimination of a single Skolem function from cutfree proofs increases the length of such proofs only linearly. Our result is based on adapting Maehara's method [10, Lemma 8.11 ] for a cut-free variant of sequent calculus without eigenvariable condition.
In our method of proof system, called here LK h , we use Henkin constants instead of free variables in quantifier inferences. ( We borrowed the idea from [6] .) Strong quantifier rules of LK h are of the form:
The Henkin constants c ∃xA and c ∃x¬A are called a witness for ∃xA and a counterexample to ∀xA, respectively. If ∃xA is true then the constant c ∃xA denotes an element from the domain of discourse which, when assigned to the variable x, makes A true. If ∀xA is false then the constant c ∃x¬A denotes an element from the domain which, when assigned to the variable x, makes A false.
This intended meaning of Henkin constants is expressed by the Henkin witnessing and counterexample axioms. These are formulas of the form:
The sequent calculus LK h is sound in the following sense: every formula provable in LK h is true in any structure which is a model for the set consisting of all Henkin axioms. If the formula is pure, i.e. if it does not contain any Henkin constant, then this implies that the formula is logically valid (see Thm. 2.4).
In [6] , we have already examined the feasibility of using Henkin constants in a first-order tableaux. Our tableaux are dual to the tableaux of Smullyan [9] as they demonstrate logical consequence. By a direct translation of the arguments used for our tableaux we obtain soundness and completeness of the sequent calculus LK h for granted (see Thm. 3.6) .
At the heart of our results, as it will be demonstrated in the proofs of the elimination lemmas 6.1 and 6.3, there is the following useful structural property of LK hinferences and a novel transformation of LK h -derivations:
• Strong locality property. The validity of each LK h -inference step depends only on the form of its principal and minor formulas, it does not depend on its side formulas.
• Both the property and the transformation are specific to LK h -proofs; they cannot be readily adapted to proof calculi with eigenvariable condition. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is completely preparatory. In Section 3 we give a detailed description of the sequent calculus LK h . Section 4 contains some examples of LK h -proofs. In Section 5 we study basic properties of LK h -derivations. Section 6 contains proofs of our main results.
First-order logic
We start with a quick review of basic notions from first-order logic. The reader is referred to [10, 4] for more details. We wish to stress here that under 'terms' and 'formulas' we understand 'closed terms' and 'closed formulas' (sentences). Our use of 'semiterms' and 'semiformulas' comes from Takeuti [10] .
First-order languages.
Logical symbols of first-order languages include the full set of propositional connectives ⊤ (true), ⊥ (falsehood), ¬, ∧, ∨, → , ↔ and quantifiers ∃, ∀; binary connectives are right associative and listed in the order of decreasing precedence. Each first-order language is fully given by the set of its nonlogical symbols: constants, function symbols and predicate symbols.
Semiterms are built from variables and constants by application of function symbols. Terms are closed semiterms; they do not contain variables. Semiformulas are built from atomic semiformulas by application of propositional connectives and quantifiers. Formulas are closed semiformulas; all their variables are bound. We will use letters r, s,t and A, B,C to stand for semiterms and semiformulas, respectively.
By A x [t] we denote the substitution of a variable x by a term t for every free occurrence of the variable x in a semiformula A. The simultaneous substitution A x 1 ,...,x n [t 1 , . . . ,t n ] is defined analogously. We write A[x 1 , . . . , x n ] to indicate every free occurrence of (pairwise distinct) variables x 1 , . . . , x n in A, and A[t 1 , . . . ,t n ] as an abbreviation for A x 1 ,...,x n [t 1 , . . . ,t n ]. A similar notation convention holds also for semiterms.
The notions of subsemiterm and subsemiformula have a standard definition. By subformula we mean to be that of a subformula in the sense of Gentzen. For instance, if ∀xB or ∃xB is a subformula of A, then so is each (closed) instance B x [t] of B.
By expression of a first-order language L (L-expression for short) we mean either semiterm or semiformula of L. We will use E 1 ≡ E 2 as the syntactic identity over expressions of the same kind.
Henkin constants and witnessing expansion.
Let L be a first-order language. Let further C 0 ,C 2 ,C 2 , . . . ,C n ,C n+1 , . . . be an infinite sequence of sets of first-order constants defined inductively as follows
The set C n+1 is thus obtained from the set C n by addition of a new constant c ∃xA for each existential formula ∃xA of the first-order language L ∪ C n provided it is not already in C n . The set of Henkin (witnessing) constants C for L is defined as their union: C = ∞ n=0 C n . We refer to the formula ∃xA as the index of the witnessing constant c ∃xA . We will use the lowercase letters a, b, . . . to denote Henkin constants.
We obtain the witnessing expansion L(C) of L by adding all Henkin witnessing constants C to the first-order language L:
The rank of a semiterm or semiformula of L(C) is the minimal number n such that the expression belongs to the first-order language L ∪ C n . Pure semiterms and pure semiformulas have ranks equal to 0; they do not contain any Henkin constants.
Henkin and quantifier axioms.
Let L be a first-order language and L(C) its witnessing expansion. Henkin axioms for L are L(C)-formulas of the form
The first formula is called witnessing axiom and the second counterexample axiom. The Henkin constants c ∃xA and c ∃x¬A are called a witness for ∃xA and a counterexample to ∀xA, respectively. The informal idea behind the constants is obvious. Quantifier axioms for L are L(C)-formulas of the form (t is arbitrary L(C)-term)
It is obvious that quantifier axioms are logically valid formulas. By a Henkin structure we mean an L(C)-structure which is a model for the set consisting of all Henkin axioms for L. As we will see in Section 3, L(C)-formulas provable in LK h are true in every Henkin structure. As a straightforward consequence of the next theorem we immediately obtain that LK h -provable pure formulas are logically valid. This proves the soundness of the sequent calculus LK h . 2.5 Remark. The following theorem reduces the problem of recognizing logical validity to conceptually much simpler problem of recognizing a certain propositional tautology. From the theorem one gets without difficulty the completeness for ordinary first-order proof calculi. Smullyan [9] calls it the fundamental theorem of quantification theory. A modern and very readable presentation is by Barwise in [4] 2.6 Theorem (The reduction to propositional logic). A pure formula A is logically valid if and only if there are Henkin and quantifier axioms A 1 , . . . , A n such that the implication A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n → A is a (propositional) tautology.
Proof. It follows from [4, Main Lemma 4.8].
Sequent calculus LK h
The axiom system LK h is a variant of the sequent calculus G3c. The distinguished feature of G3c is that sequents are pairs of multisets of formulas. Weak structural rules such as contraction and weakening are thus absorbed into logical inference rules and axioms (see [11] for details). The main difference between G3c and our method of sequent calculus is that LK h uses Henkin constants instead of free variables. We also wish to stress here that LK h -derivations are cut-free.
Throughout the section we assume that a first-order language L and its witnessing expansion L(C) is fixed. All formulas and terms, unless otherwise specified, are firstorder expressions of L(C).
3.1 Finite multisets. By finite multisets we mean finite unordered collections of elements with repetitions. So a finite multiset is like an ordinary set only it may contain some elements with multiple occurrences. We will use Greek capitals Γ, ∆, . . . to stand for finite multisets.
For finite multisets we adopt the following notation conventions. If A is an element, then by the same symbol A we denote the finite multiset containing A as its only element. By Γ, ∆ we denote the union of finite multisets Γ and ∆. Multisets A, Γ and Γ, A are thus the result of adding the element A to the finite multiset Γ.
3.2 Sequents. By a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ we mean the ordered pair (Γ, ∆) of finite (possibly empty) multisets of formulas, The sequent arrow ⇒ separates the antecedent Γ of the sequent from its succedent ∆. Together they are called cedents. We will use the uppercase letter S, possibly subscripted, as a syntactic variable ranging over sequents.
The meaning of a sequent of the form A 1 , . . . , A m ⇒ B 1 , . . . , B n is equivalent in the meaning to the formula A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A m → B 1 ∨ · · · ∨ B n . An empty conjunction (m = 0) is defined to be ⊤ and an empty disjunction (n = 0) is defined to be ⊥. The sequent ⇒ A has thus the same meaning as the formula A and the empty sequent ⇒ is logically unsatisfiable.
Inference rules. The rules of inference of LK h are of the form
where S, S 1 , S 2 are sequents. Premises (hypotheses) of a rule are its upper sequents, the conclusion of a rule is its lower sequent. Nullary rules, i.e. rules with no premises, are called axioms. The following is the list of valid rules of inference of LK h :
The quantifier rules L∃ and R∀ are called strong quantifier rules, the other two quantifier rules are called weak. We say that the Henkin constants c ∃xA and c ∃x¬A belong to the strong quantifier rules L∃ and R∀, respectively.
For every rule, the new formula introduced into the rule's conclusion is called the principal (main) formula, formulas from which the principal formula is derived are called the minor (auxiliary) formulas, and all the remaining formulas are called the side formulas (context). In the axiom Ax both occurrences of A are principal, in Ax⊥ and Ax⊤ both occurrences of the propositional constants are principal.
Note that all inference rules of LK h are local in the following strong sense: the validity of each inference step depends only on the form the principal and minor formulas, it does not depend on the context.
Proofs.
A proof in LK h (LK h -proof) is a rooted labeled finite tree with sequents as its nodes. The root of the tree, written at the bottom, is called endsequent and it is the sequent to be proved. The remaining nodes of the tree are built by inference rules. The leaves, at the top of the tree, are initial sequents inferred by axiom rules. The inner nodes of the tree are inferred by the remaining inference rules.
We
By an LK h -proof of a formula A we mean any LK h -proof of its corresponding sequent ⇒ A. The length of a proof π is the number of sequents in π. We write π ⊢ l Γ ⇒ ∆ if the length of the proof π is l, and ⊢ l Γ ⇒ ∆ if there is such a proof. We write π ⊢ ≤l Γ ⇒ ∆ if the length of the proof π is ≤ l, and ⊢ ≤l Γ ⇒ ∆ if there is such a proof. The notation π ⊢ <l Γ ⇒ ∆ and ⊢ <l Γ ⇒ ∆ is defined analogously.
3.5 Remark. Our usage of Henkin constants in strong quantifier rules is rather nonstandard; therefore, we give here an outline of the proof of the soundness and completeness theorem for LK h . It is an adaptation of the proof for a formal system based on first-order tableaux with Henkin constants instead of free variables (see [6] for details). But first, we need to introduce some new notation and terminology:
• By H and Q we denote the set of all Henkin and quantifier axioms, respectively.
• By PK we denote the propositional sequent calculus containing all inference rules of LK h except for quantifier rules.
• The cut rule is an inference rule of the form
We follow closely the proof of the soundness and completeness theorem for the method of tableaux as presented in [6] . By a straightforward translation of the arguments for tableaux to sequents we obtain soundness and completeness of LK h .
Soundness and completeness theorem. A pure formula is logically valid if and only if it is LK h -provable.
Proof outlined. A pure formula A is logically valid iff, by reduction to propositional logic (see Thm. 2.6), for some {A 1 , . . . , A n } ⊆ H ∪ Q the formula A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n → A is a tautology iff, by the soundness and completeness theorem for PK (see [6, Thm. 7] ), for some {A 1 , . . . , A n } ⊆ H ∪ Q the formula A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n → A has a PK-proof with cuts iff, by the soundness and completeness theorem for non-analytic calculus (see [6, Thm. 11] ), the formula A has an LK h -proof with cuts iff, by the cut-elimination theorem (see [6, Thm. 18] ), the formula A has a (cut-free) LK h -proof.
Examples of LK h -proofs
We give here several examples of LK h -derivations so that the reader gets familiar with the usage of Henkin constants in formal proofs. The reader interested primarily in the main result of the paper may skip and go directly to Section 5.
Example. The following tree is an LK
of the formula ∃y∀xP(x, y) → ∀x∃yP(x, y). The defining abbreviations for the Henkin constants a and b are shown on the right next to the rule they belong. The inferences in question are the following strong quantifier rules shown in the full form:
When the tree is read as a standard LK-proof, then both free variables a and b satisfy the standard eigenvariable condition. When the tree is read as a standard LK-proof, then the proper variable a of the strong quantifier rule R∀ violates the standard eigenvariable condition. This is because a occurs in the side formula D(a) of the conclusion of the R∀-inference. This kind of violation is still sound because it satisfies the prerequisites of the Smullyan's liberalized form of eigenvariable condition (see [9] for details). (x, y) ). The Henkin constants a and b belong to the strong quantifier rule R∀ and L∃, respectively. Note that the constant a occurs deeply in the constant b.
When the tree is read as a standard LK-proof, then the proper variable b of the L∃inference violates even the Smullyan's liberalized form of eigenvariable condition.
Namely, the principal formula ∃zP(a, z) of the L∃-rule contains the proper variable of a strong quantifier inference occurring below L∃; in this case, it contains the free variable a which belongs to the R∀-rule. Even this kind of violation is sound because it satisfies the prerequisites of a very liberalized form of eigenvariable condition for the doublet of sequent calculi LK + /LK ++ introduced in [1] . This is because the rank of the constant a is less than the rank of the constant b. Hence, the dependencies between proper variables of the proof do not form a "cycle" (see [1] for details).
Example. Finally, consider an LK h -proof
of the formula ¬∀xR(x) ↔ ∃x¬R(x). Again, for the sake of convenience, we have used an abbreviation; in this case a ≡ c ∃x¬R(x) . The Henkin constant a belongs to two strong quantifier rules (shown in the full form)
with different principal formulas: ∀xR(x) and ∃x¬R(x).
Properties of LK h -proofs
In this section we investigate the properties of LK h -derivations. Some of them are vital in the proof of our main result in the last section: the inversion lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 for L∀ and R∃ quantifier inferences, and the replacement lemma 5.8. They are specific to LK h -proofs as they cannot be easily adapted to sequent calculi with eigenvariable condition. Throughout the whole section we assume that a first-order language L and its witnessing expansion L(C) is fixed. We also extend the notion of expression to include sequents, inference rules, and proofs.
Subformula property.
If π is an LK h -proof, then every formula of π is a subformula of some formula from the endsequent of π.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the structure of the LK h -proof π.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the LK h -proof π ⊢ l Γ ⇒ ∆. We consider several cases according to the last rule applied in π. Suppose, for example, that the proof π ends with an L∃-inference of the form
We apply the inductive hypothesis to the subderivation π 1 ⊢ l−1 A x [c ∃xA ], Γ ⇒ ∆ and find a proof π ′ 1 such that π ′ 1 ⊢ l−1 A x [c ∃xA ], Γ, Γ ′ ⇒ ∆, ∆ ′ . We now use a similar L∃-rule and obtain a derivation
We are done because we clearly have π ′ ⊢ l ∃xA, Γ, Γ ′ ⇒ ∆, ∆ ′ .
The remaining cases are proved similarly.
Inversion lemma for
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the structure of LK h -proofs.
Inversion lemma for L∀
∀xA, Π n ⇒ Λ n be a sequence of all L∀-inferences applied in π with ∀xA as principal formula. Then
Proof. By induction on the structure of the LK h -proof π ⊢ l ∀xA, Γ ⇒ ∆. We distinguish several cases according to the last rule applied in π. The case, when the last inference of π is an axiom, is straightforward. Note that in this case it must be n = 0.
Suppose the proof π ends with an L∀-inference with ∀xA as principal formula. We may assume w.l.o.g. that the term in the minor formula is t n :
The subproof π 1 ⊢ l−1 ∀xA, A x [t n ], Γ ⇒ ∆ contains the remaining n − 1 L∀-inferences with ∀xA as principal formula. We apply the inductive hypothesis to π 1 and, since
Suppose now the proof π ends with an L∃-inference of the form
We apply the inductive hypothesis to the subderivation π 1 ⊢ l−1 ∀xA, B y [c ∃yB ], Γ 1 ⇒ ∆ and find a proof π ′ 1 such that π ′
We now use a similar L∃-inference and construct a proof
We are done because we clearly have π ′ ⊢ l−n A
Suppose, for example, the proof π ends with an R∧-inference of the form
where π 1 ⊢ l 1 ∀xA, Γ ⇒ ∆ 1 , B and π 2 ⊢ l 2 ∀xA, Γ ⇒ ∆ 1 ,C for some numbers l 1 , l 2 such that l 1 + l 2 + 1 = l. We may assume w.l.o.g. that the subproof π 1 contains the first k L∀-rules with ∀xA as principal formula and the subproof π 2 the remaining n − k. We apply the inductive hypothesis to both subderivations and obtain
By the weakening lemma 5.2 we find proofs π ′ 1 and π ′ 2 such that
Finally, we use a similar R∧-rule and obtain a proof
5.5
Inversion lemma for R∃. Let π ⊢ l Γ ⇒ ∆, ∃xA. Let further
be a sequence of all R∃-inferences applied in π with ∃xA as principal formula. Then
Proof. By induction on the structure of the LK h -proof π ⊢ l Γ ⇒ ∆, ∃xA. We distinguish several cases according to the last rule applied in π. The case, when the last inference of π is an axiom, is straightforward. Note that in this case it must be n = 0.
Suppose the proof π ends with an R∃-inference with ∃xA as principal formula. We may assume w.l.o.g. that the term in the minor formula is t n :
, ∃xA contains the remaining n − 1 R∃-inferences with ∃xA as principal formula. We apply the inductive hypothesis to π 1 and, since
We apply the inductive hypothesis to the subderivation π 1 ⊢ l−1 B y [c ∃yB ], Γ 1 ⇒ ∆, ∃xA and find a proof π ′ 1 such that π ′
. We now use a similar L∃-inference and construct a proof
We are done because we clearly have π ′ ⊢ l−n ∃yB,
Suppose, for example, the proof π ends with an L∨-inference of the form
where π 1 ⊢ l 1 B, Γ 1 ⇒ ∆, ∃xA and π 2 ⊢ l 2 C, Γ 1 ⇒ ∆, ∃xA for some numbers l 1 , l 2 such that l 1 + l 2 + 1 = l. We may assume w.l.o.g. that the subproof π 1 contains the first k R∃-rules with ∃xA as principal formula and the subproof π 2 the remaining n − k. We apply the inductive hypothesis to both subderivations and obtain
Finally, we use a similar L∨-rule and obtain a proof
, and we are done.
5.6
Deep replacement of terms. We say that a term r occurs deeply in an expression E if the term r has an (ordinary) occurrence in the expression E or else there is a Henkin constant c ∃xA , which have an (ordinary) occurrence in the expression E, such that the term r occurs deeply in its index ∃xA. We then say that the term r is a deep subterm of the expression E. The subterm is proper if r ≡ E. By a deep replacement of a term r by a term s in an expression E, written E{r/s}, we mean the replacement of every deep occurrence of the term r in the expression E by the term s. The replacement is non-trivial if r ≡ s.
Example. Consider the Henkin witnessing axiom ∃xP(1, x) → P (1, c ∃xP(1,x) ). The constant 1 has three occurrences in it. The first two are ordinary occurrences; the third one -that in the index of the Henkin constant c ∃xP(1,x) -is deep. The deep replacement of 1 by 2 applied to the axiom yields another Henkin witnessing axiom: It is easy to see that deep replacement does not change the character of axioms and propositional inference rules. This is shown here for an L∧-inference:
A{r/s}, B{r/s}, Γ{r/s} ⇒ ∆{r/s} L∧ A{r/s} ∧ B{r/s}, Γ{r/s} ⇒ ∆{r/s} All these inferences are therefore invariant under deep replacements of terms.
The character of a quantifier inference might be destroyed under a deep replacement. For an ∃-quantifier rule L∃ or R∃ to be invariant under the deep replacement of r by s we require that the same change is done to both its premise and conclusion: This self-correcting nature of deep replacement -turning an invariant strong quantifier rule into an another valid inference of similar kind -is the reason for extending the customary term replacement to operate also on the indices of Henkin constants.
Remark. We give here a sufficient condition under which quantifier rules of LK hproofs are invariant under deep replacement. Consider a (non-trivial) deep replacement of a term r by a term s in a proof π such that the next two conditions are met:
(i) The term r is different from every Henkin constant belonging to some strong quantifier rule applied in π.
(ii) For every quantifier inference applied in π with the principal formula QxA and the minor formula A x [t], there is no subsemiterm r ′ ≡ x of A, with at least one free occurrence of the variable x, such that r ′
Under such conditions every quantifier inference applied in the proof π is invariant under deep replacement of the term r by the term s.
Replacement lemma.
If every rule of the proof π ⊢ l Γ ⇒ ∆ is invariant under deep replacement of a term r by a term s, then π{r/s} ⊢ l Γ{r/s} ⇒ ∆{r/s}.
Eliminating unary Skolem functions
In the proof of the next lemma we closely follow the Maehara's method [10, Lemma 8.11] . Note that we are working in the witnessing expansion of the first-order language L ∪ { f }. By f -terms we mean terms with the outermost function symbol f .
The proof π 1 has the subformula property 5.1 and A, Γ, ∆ do not contain the function symbol f . Hence π 1 satisfies both conditions (i) and (ii) in Par. 5.7; they are sufficient for quantifier rules to be invariant under deep replacement of f -terms. Consequently, all inferences applied in π 1 are invariant under such replacements.
Step (2): Let a 1 , . . . , a n be the Henkin witnessing constants for the existential formulas ∃yA[s 1 , y], . . . , ∃yA[s n , y]: y] (i = 1, . . . , n).
We eliminate the terms f (s 1 ), . . . , f (s n ) from π 1 by (deeply) replacing them with the Henkin constants a 1 , . . . , a n . So let
By the n-fold application of the replacement lemma 5.8 and by recalling that A, Γ, ∆ do not contain any deep occurrence of the function symbol f , we have
From the arrangement of terms in the sequence s 1 , . . . , s n we can conclude that
Consequently, s ′ i and a ′ i are obtained from s i and a i by deep replacement of only those terms f (s j ) by a j for which the inequality j > i holds:
(i = 1, . . . , n)
The proof π 1 has the subformula property 5.1 and A, Γ, ∆ do not contain the function symbol g. Hence π 1 satisfies both conditions (i) and (ii) in Par. 5.7; they are sufficient for quantifier rules to be invariant under deep replacement of g-terms. Consequently, all inferences applied in π 1 are invariant under such replacements.
Step (2): Let a 1 , . . . , a n be the Henkin counterexample constants for the universal formulas ∀yA[s 1 , y], . . . , ∀yA[s n , y]: y] (i = 1, . . . , n).
We eliminate the terms g(s 1 ), . . . , g(s n ) from π 1 by (deeply) replacing them with the Henkin constants a 1 , . . . , a n . So let π 2 ≡ π 1 {g(s 1 )/a 1 } · · · {g(s n )/a n } s ′ i ≡ s i {g(s 1 )/a 1 } · · · {g(s n )/a n } (i = 1, . . . , n) a ′ i ≡ g(s i ){g(s 1 )/a 1 } · · · {g(s n )/a n } (i = 1, . . . , n).
By the n-fold application of the replacement lemma 5.8 and by recalling that A, Γ, ∆ do not contain any deep occurrence of the function symbol g, we have
Consequently, s ′ i and a ′ i are obtained from s i and a i by deep replacement of only those terms g(s j ) by a j for which the inequality j > i holds:
{g(s n )/a n }.
(i = 1, . . . , n) (Hence s ′ n ≡ s n and a ′ n ≡ a n .) From this and (2) Step (4) : By the weakening lemma 5.2 applied to π 3 we find a proof π 4 ⊢ l Γ ⇒ ∆, ∀yA[s ′ 1 , y], . . . , ∀yA[s ′ n , y], ∃x∀yA[x, y].
Step (5) 
each with ∃x∀yA[x, y] as principal formula, we find a proof π 5 ⊢ l+n Γ ⇒ ∆, ∃x∀yA[x, y].
Step (6) : We eliminate the remaining g-terms occurred deeply in the proof π 5 by replacing them (deeply) by some terms from the witnessing expansion of L. (The proof π 5 is invariant under such replacements!) By the replacement lemma 5.8 we thus obtain an LK h -proof in L such that
The claim now follows from the inequality l + n < l + l = 2l. Proof. It follows directly from the elimination lemma 6.3.
Conclusion
The paper leaves two important questions unanswered:
• What is the complexity of the elimination of a single Skolem function of arity k ≥ 1 from cut-free proofs?
• What is the complexity of the elimination of a single Skolem function from cut-free proofs in first-order logic with equality?
We hope that in near future we will be able to give a positive answer to the first question. But unlike in the unary case, we cannot rely on L∃ and R∃ inversion lemmas in the general case k ≥ 1. One has to work harder to obtain optimal tight upper bounds on proof lengths. Still, we suppose that a calculus like LK h -with strong locality property and with flexible term replacement operation -should make structural proof analysis of such problems much easier. A partial positive solution for the second and more harder problem was given by Avigad in [2] : theories strong enough to code finite functions can eliminate Skolem functions in polynomial time. But the general problem for pure logic with equality is still an open question in the field of proof complexity.
